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Abstract 
We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash 
rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to 
shareholder scrutiny and, thus, will have high agency conflicts as the distance will facilitate the 
extraction of private benefits. Consistent with our predictions, we find a positive relation between 
the distance to the main metropolitan area and cash holdings, and this impact is more pronounced 
when the controlling shareholder has high levels of excess control rights (i.e., separation of cash-
flow rights and control rights). Our results hold even after accounting for all control variables, 
including financial constraints, and suggest that geographic remoteness can be conducive to 
severe agency problems, particularly when there is a large separation of cash-flow rights and 
control rights. 
JEL Classification: G30; G31; G32; G35. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite ongoing advances in communication technology, firms’ geographic location is 
still shaping corporate behavior. Previous studies show that proximate investors, both individuals 
and institutions, are more likely to favor nearby firms because of their ability to oversee 
management when the distance between shareholders and firms is small. For example, many 
venture capitalists (VCs) limit their investments to the geographic area within a 20-minute drive, 
as was the case of Facebook, among others, that received its first round of financing (about $12.7 
million) from Accel Partners one year after locating four blocks away from the venture firm 
(Tian, 2011), partly because VCs are more reticent to visit or sit in boards of more geographically 
distant portfolio firms (Lerner, 1995). Moreover, since the finding of Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) that investors prefer local companies, a number of studies document that 
locality is associated with more liquid stocks (Loughran and Schultz, 2005), advantageous 
information on acquisition activity (Kang and Kim, 2008), better price formation in securities 
markets (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) and lower behavioral biases (Giannini et al., 2013). This 
evidence suggests that proximity to firms’ location can improve the way in which investors and 
corporate officials can access and a assess company’s information, and thereby contribute to the 
decision-making process.  
We focus on the effect of distance on corporate cash holdings. We argue that corporate 
geographic location affects the ability of outsiders to monitor the controlling shareholder’s actions 
including those on cash holdings. Our conjecture is that cash management policies are less 
observable in remotely located firms, which give the controlling shareholder opportunities to 
pursue private benefits by accumulating cash rather than disgorging it in investments or 
dividends. This view is associated with the notion that insiders are willing to hoard cash 
exceeding the firm needs, since the unused cash can be easily diverted to personal consumption or 
spent in investments that negatively affect firm value (Faleye, 2004;  Harford, 1999; Harford et 
al., 2008; Jensen, 1986). We, therefore, test whether, in remotely located firms, cash holdings 
3 
constitute a channel through which the controlling shareholder can obtain private benefits, 
because vigilant oversight against such egregious behavior is difficult to achieve.  
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 4,111 observations of French listed firms over 
the period 1998 to 2007. We measure remoteness by the distance between the location of firms’ 
headquarters and the Paris region to capture the extent of monitoring costs. We expect firms that 
are located inside the Paris region to have a large number of adjacent investors and lower 
monitoring costs compared to their remote counterparts. Consistent with our predictions, we find 
that cash holding increases as firms’ distance from the Paris region increases, and that firms 
located in the Paris region set significantly lower cash holdings than their remotely located 
counterparts. These results provide evidence that large cash holdings are associated with the 
impaired ability to monitor managerial actions of remotely located firms. We next examine the 
extent to which distance influences cash when control rights and cash-flow rights are separated. 
We find that the positive effect of distance on cash is more pronounced in firms that exhibit large 
separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. These results are consistent with the notion that 
firms incur higher agency costs when geographic remoteness is coupled with a large separation of 
cash-flow rights and control rights.  
Our research adds to the corporate governance literature that identifies agency motives as 
contributing to large holdings of cash (see, e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al.,  2008). 
Agency costs associated with liquid assets are particularly high when control rights are higher 
than cash-flow rights. Masulis et al. (2009), for instance, acknowledge that greater separation of 
insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights results in more expropriation of cash reserves, leading 
to a decrease in the value of cash holdings. Becker et al. (2011) use the geographical proximity of 
large shareholders as an instrument for their monitoring power to find that superior monitoring 
exerted by large shareholders (i.e., nearby blockholders) tends to mitigate agency problems by 
reducing corporate cash holdings. We expand this trend in the literature by investigating the effect 
of firm location on cash holdings in an agency theory framework. 
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Our analysis is conducted under the French system typically characterized by a large 
separation of cash-flow rights and control rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002). In such an 
environment, controlling shareholders have power over the firm’s resources that exceed their 
cash-flow rights allowing them to convert these resources, including cash balances, into private 
benefits. Using geographic remoteness as a proxy for monitoring costs, a likely implication is that 
excess control rights would exacerbate agency costs associated with the liquid assets of remotely 
located firms. We show how the separation of the controlling shareholder’s cash-flow and control 
rights affects the relation between geographic location and cash holdings. 
An alternative explanation of our result may be that distant firms hoard cash because they 
face greater financial constraints as they have high information asymmetry due to little 
transparency and few corporate disclosures (Ali et al., 2007; Attig et al., 2006; Fan and Wong, 
2002) and/or they incur high costs of external finance (Arena and Dewally, 2012). We test this 
conjecture by using payout ratio as a proxy of financial constraints. We find that the effect of 
distance on cash held by firms with excess control rights is indifferent to the degree of their 
financial constraints, thus lending additional support for the agency motive for cash holdings. We 
consider, however, that the use of payout in our case may be problematic because according to 
La Porta et al. (2000) weak governance firms may pay low dividends if payouts emanate from a 
legal protection of minority shareholders (outcome model) or high dividends if they are substitute 
for weak shareholder protection (substitute model).1 We, therefore, provide a number of 
robustness tests by using firm size, the adjusted Kaplan and Zingales (1997), AKZ, and the 
adjusted Whited and Wu (2006), AWW, indices, as alternative measures of financial constraints. 
In addition, we account for endogeneity issues, test robustness of our results to alternative sample 
compositions, and consider different statistical approaches. We find relatively similar results.  
                                                          
1 For further empirical evidence on the outcome and substitute models, see, for example, Alzahrani and Lasfer 
(2012), Brockman and Unlu (2009), Faccio et al. (2001), La Porta et al., (2000), Mitton (2004), and Shao et 
al. (2013). John et al. (2011) suggests that since distance engenders considerable free cash flow, remote firms 
may pre-commit to higher dividends to decrease agency costs of such free cash flow, in line with Stulz (1990).  
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While our focus is mainly on the agency explanation of cash, we also account for the 
predictions of the two other theories, namely the trade-off and the pecking order theories. The 
trade-off theory emphasizes the transaction cost and precautionary motives for holding cash and 
suggests that firms, in the absence of agency conflicts, determine their optimal cash policies by 
balancing the marginal costs and benefits of these liquid assets. For example, Harford et 
al. (2014) show that firms mitigate their refinancing risk by increasing their cash holdings. On 
the other hand, the pecking-order theory emphasizes the informational asymmetries between 
managers and investors and explains the role of cash as a buffer between retained earnings and 
investment needs. These two theories suggest the impact of the following firm specific variables, 
among others, on cash reserves which we include in our analysis: capital expenditures, cash flow, 
dividend, market-to-book ratio, leverage, net working capital, size, and cash flow volatility. Our 
results are strong even after accounting for these effects. 
Our research contributes to prior literature in several ways. Almazan et al. (2010) develop 
an analytical model in support of the view that geographically clustered firms tend to have more 
investment opportunities, and require increased cash holdings to undertake more acquisitions. 
Landier et al. (2009) show that firms’ geographic dispersion substantially affects labor and 
divestiture policies. Kedia et al. (2008) provide evidence that bidders obtain higher returns when 
they target geographically proximate firms. Loughran (2008) contends that rural firms are less 
inclined to issue equity than their metropolitan peers due to the presence of distance-related 
information frictions. These arguments imply that remotely located firms hold more cash 
because of the running and the start-up costs of attracting capital and the potential capital 
rationing in case of financial crisis. We consider that these “connection” effects may be 
complementary or substitutes (or not related) to our argument that distant firms hold more 
cash because of a decrease in shareholder scrutiny. If the connection and monitoring effects 
are complementary, then the longer the distance the worse are these problems, the higher the 
cash holding. However, if our results reflect more the connection effects rather than the 
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monitoring factors, then distance should matter in widely-held firms. We test for these effects 
by re-running our tests using a sample that consists of only widely held firms. Our sample 
decreased from 4,111 to 206 observations. The results show that distance is not significant, 
suggesting that cash holding is driven more by agency conflicts between dominant and 
minority shareholders. Overall, we expand previous evidence by focusing on the effects of 
remoteness on cash holdings, and provide new insight into the way geographic factors alter firm 
behavior. 
We further test for the possibility of hoarding cash by the controlling shareholders for 
precautionary reasons, especially when they are undiversified and a large part of their wealth 
is invested in the firm. Cash is, in this case, a buffer against unexpected negative cash flow 
shocks (i.e., high firm risk). We accounted for this possibility in all our regressions by using 
Cash Flow Volatility, computed as standard deviation of cash flow-to-net assets for the past 
five years, as a proxy for firm risk. This variable considers the possibility that higher cash flow 
uncertainty is associated with larger cash holdings, and the empirical results show that it is 
positive and statistically significant, which supports the rationale that risky firms hoard more cash 
than other firms do. We also test the possibility that the positive effect of distance on cash 
holdings of firms with high excess control reflects the possibility that undiversified 
controlling shareholders use cash as a convenient "buffer" for adverse events. Since 
controlling shareholders in stand-alone companies are more likely to be undiversified than 
those who own many firms forming a group, we run our regression on the sample of group-
affiliated firms where controlling shareholders are supposed to be more diversified. In 
addition, we know that a given level of “Excess Control” can correspond to different levels of 
ownership stakes. We consider the cases where the ownership interests of the controlling 
shareholders in the firm are low (i.e., 10% < UCF < 20%). These cases correspond to 
situations where the controlling shareholder is likely to be more diversified. We run our 
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regressions on the sample of firms with UCF between 10% and 20%. Our results remain 
qualitatively similar. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 
presents summary statistics and univariate analysis. Section 5 discusses the results of multivariate 
analysis. Section 6 reports the results of several robustness checks. In Section 7 we test for 
endogeneity. Section 8 summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Review of the literature and hypotheses tested 
2.1. Firms’ geographic location and cash holdings 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) argue that investors have strong preferences for nearby 
firms. They show that U.S. mutual fund portfolios are biased toward neighbor firms and that 
household investors outperform their distant counterparts given that investors are better off with 
nearby firms. Hau (2001) argues that proximity to core financial professionals may provide 
investors with more opportunities for acquiring first-hand and low-cost information so as to 
optimize their investment portfolios. Wrigley et al. (2003) contend that financial professionals are 
more prone to develop knowledge spillovers in the vicinity of local business networks that afford 
them more opportunities for direct and privileged relationships with company officials. In 
contrast, distant investors are less able to closely inspect corporate management, and, thus, to 
provide effective monitoring because of decreased visibility of managerial actions at greater 
distances, and to acquire specific knowledge about firm’s operations or a deep understanding of 
its technical and cultural characteristics (Gaspar and Massa, 2007).  
Preferences for more proximate firms may also be driven by familiarity. Huberman (2001) 
argues that investors are more willing to invest in firms that they can observe directly and follow 
in local media. Zhu (2002) states that heavy spending on advertising and marketing is prone to 
increase investors’ familiarity with the firm. Consistent with this view, Barber and Odean (2005) 
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argue that regular corporate news releases and local social networks develop familiarity making 
firms more attractive to nearby investors. Alternatively, geographic remoteness leads investors to 
be less familiar with the company matters. Distant investors may therefore incur relatively high 
oversight costs, which probably undermine their monitoring incentives and abilities. 
Previous studies also document the implications of this distance. Petersen and 
Rajan (2002) contend that banks are less likely to grant credit to distant firms where internal 
operations are not well observable, since assessment of business risks requires banks to have close 
formal and informal relationships with their borrowers. Mian (2006) finds that agency costs 
arising from cultural differences and geographical remoteness frequently prevent foreign banks 
from lending local firms with low-visibility operations. Grote and Täube (2006) and Bae et 
al. (2008) show that financial analysts follow more nearby firms since they can easily have regular 
face-to-face conversations with officials and board members of local firms, which affects the way 
data integrity and rumors are addressed. Masulis et al. (2012) analyze the effectiveness of boards 
of directors including foreign members and report that independent directors who usually reside 
abroad are less inclined to regularly attend board meetings and to capitalize on specific knowledge 
through on-site visits leading to decreased monitoring performance. 
We expand these impacts to the possibility that in remotely located firms, controlling 
shareholders may hold abnormally large cash reserves which may lead to agency problems, 
especially when investment opportunities are low. A large number of previous studies examine 
the effect of corporate governance quality on cash holdings and conclude that managers of poorly 
governed firms accumulate more cash which is more likely to be spent in investments that 
negatively affect firm value (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008; Kalcheva and 
Lins, 2007; Kusnadi, 2011). Other studies find strong evidence that poor protection of 
shareholders rights is associated with a considerable decrease in the value of cash holdings (e.g., 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Drobetz et al., 2010). 
9 
We expect the agency costs associated with hoarding cash to be influenced by firms’ 
geographic location, as remoteness of firms’ headquarters may decrease the observability of 
managerial actions and thereby makes monitoring tasks costly. The costs of management 
monitoring are likely to be lower in the vicinity of corporate decision-makers. In this thread, Baik 
et al. (2010) allege that local institutional investors are likely to be good monitors because 
geographic proximity allows them to build long-term relationships with corporate decision-
makers. Chen et al. (2010) argue that firms clustering around metropolitan areas are followed by a 
large number of specialized financial professionals, which increases the visibility of managerial 
actions and thus decreases the costs of their monitoring. John et al. (2011) show that distance 
generates considerable agency costs of free cash flow leading firms located away from the ten 
largest US metropolitan areas to increase their dividend payouts as a way to mitigate such costs. 
Ayers et al. (2011) document that managers’ discretion over financial reporting increases with the 
geographic remoteness of institutional investors from a firm’s headquarters; they conclude that 
monitoring costs incurred by these investors increase with distance. Similarly, Chhaochharia et 
al. (2012) find that corporate monitoring is more effective when excreting by local institutional 
investors than by their non-local counterparts. These arguments motivate our first hypothesis: 
H1: Corporate cash holdings increase with distance from metropolitan areas. 
 
2.2. Excess control rights, firms’ geographic location and cash holdings 
Distance from metropolitan areas may limit shareholders’ ability to provide close and 
valuable monitoring of managerial actions, including those linked to cash management. The 
presence of controlling shareholders with more control rights than cash-flow rights ostensibly 
exacerbates the adverse effects that location has on corporate policies due to the potentially high 
agency costs of excess control rights. Extensive corporate governance literature provides 
empirical evidence that larger divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights results in 
lower firm value (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Lins, 2003). Morck et 
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al. (2005) contend that family-controlled firms with higher separation of cash-flow rights and 
control rights undertake less profitable acquisitions compared to other family firms. Masulis et 
al. (2009) show that larger divergence between voting rights and the equity ownership of insiders 
(i.e., officers and directors) is associated with lower value of cash holdings, higher CEO 
compensation, value-destroying acquisitions and unprofitable capital expenditures. In support of 
this agency view, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) find that the cost of borrowing increases with 
excess control rights. Gompers et al. (2010) claim that insiders of dual-class firms often hold 
voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights, and that U.S. firms are more likely to adopt dual-class 
status when private benefits of control are relatively high. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) report 
that the adoption of dual-class structures decreases firm value, particularly when equity interests 
of the controlling shareholder are not substantial. 
Agency problems driven by distance are probably more severe when there is a large 
separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. In this spirit, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) 
show that for Swedish listed firms, the presence of excess control rights within a firm decreases 
the probability that foreign investors hold that stock. Kim et al. (2011) consistently indicate that 
foreign institutional investors are reluctant to invest in Korean chaebol firms where control rights 
are higher than cash-flow rights. These results suggest that investors are averse to situations 
characterized by a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights when they invest abroad, 
possibly because of the implied agency costs due to geographic location. Adverse implications of 
a firm’s geographic location may be reflected in large cash holdings, such that the controlling 
shareholder with larger excess control rights can easily extract private rents from cash resources 
without being subject to close scrutiny of external shareholders. We therefore expect that the 
positive effect of distance on cash holdings to be amplified in the presence of large separation of 
cash-flow rights and control rights. In light of these arguments, we propose our second 
hypothesis: 
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H2: The positive location effect on corporate cash holdings is more pronounced in firms 
where excess control rights of the controlling shareholder are higher. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data sources and sample 
We start our sample with all French listed firms available in Worldscope database during 
1998–2007. Following prior literature, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999), 
regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999), and widely held firms (i.e., firms with no major 
shareholder owning more than 10% of total control rights). We discard firms that are 
headquartered in the French Overseas Departments and Territories because considerable distance 
between these regions and the Paris region may distort the location analysis and remove those 
with missing financial or governance data. The screening process results in a total of 710 firms 
making 4,111 firm–year observations. Data on ownership structure is manually gathered from 
firms’ annual reports whereas financial data and ZIP codes for firms’ headquarters are retrieved 
from the Worldscope database. Data on latitudes and longitudes of the location of the firms’ 
headquarters are collected from Maps of World.2  
 
3.2. Baseline model specification 
To investigate the relation between geographic location and cash holdings, we supplement 
the following cash model as developed by Opler et al. (1999) with geographic variables and 
industry and year fixed effects: 
Cash = β0 + β1 Geographic variables + β2 Control variables + Industry Dummies + 
Year Dummies+ ε,           (1) 
where Cash is cash holdings computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to net assets defined as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. We use the 
                                                          
2 www.mapsofworld.com.  
12 
logarithmic transformation to reduce problems associated with skewness and to mitigate the 
influence of outlier observations. Appendix 1 provides a description of our variables. All financial 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile levels to reduce effects of outliers and our 
regression estimates are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level 
(Peterson, 2009).  
To determine the geographical location, we first obtain the four-digit ZIP code of the 
county in which the firm is headquartered the year it entered Worldscope database.3 We next 
estimate its proximity relative to Paris, the French financial center (Guillain and Le Gallo, 2010) 
using three proxies.4 First, we define Distance as the natural logarithm of one plus distance in 
kilometers between firm’s i headquarter and Paris, P, using the arc-length formula, as in Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999): 
DistanceiP = ar cos (deg)∗ 2 Л r/360,        (2)                                                                               
deg = cos(lati)∗ cos(loni)∗ cos(latP)∗ cos(lonP) + cos(lati)∗ sin(loni)∗ cos(latP)∗ sin(lonP)               
+ sin(lati) ∗  sin(latP),           (3) 
where r is the radius of the earth (6378 km); lat is latitude; and lon is longitude.  
Second, we define Distance Road as the natural logarithm of one plus road distance in 
kilometers between the location of a firm’s i headquarters and Paris region (ZIP Code 75000) as 
automobile is still the primarily transportation mode in France (Di Mento, 2009).5 Finally, we 
construct a dummy variable Outside_Paris that takes the value 1 if a firm is headquartered outside 
the Paris region, and 0 if the firms is in Paris (county code 75) or inner-ring suburbs (92, 93, 94) 
and outer-ring suburbs (77, 78, 91, 95).     
We use a number of control variables. Following Opler et al. (1999), cash holdings can be 
explained by a number of firm characteristics. Firm size can be negative due to the presence of 
                                                          
3 Some cases of relocation such as Bioalliance Pharma, Imecom SA and Bac Majestic, are made within the same 
region. Cases of relocation outside the Paris region are rare and do not affect results. 
4 According to Ernst & Young “European Headquarters: Location decisions” survey, 2009, all 67 French firms 
on Forbes top 2000 list, except for Michelin Group, are headquartered in the Paris region. 
5 Data on road distance are obtained from www.viamichelin.com website. 
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economies of scale in holding liquid assets (Miller and Orr, 1966), or positive if larger firms bring 
about more investment opportunities that, in turn, require more cash (Opler et al., 1999). We use 
market-to-book to account for the need of growth firms to hoard cash, particularly when external 
finance is costly (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Research and development is expected to have a 
positive effect on cash holdings as it is a proxy for financial distress costs. Cash flow assesses 
whether higher cash flow leads to greater cash accumulation. Net working capital is non-cash 
liquid resources that, as a substitute for cash, should negatively affect the level of cash holdings 
(Kim et al., 1998). Cash flow volatility accounts for the possibility that higher cash flow 
uncertainty is associated with larger cash holdings. Leverage controls for the fact that cash is 
generally affected by debt repayment. Capital expenditure decreases cash holding as it constitutes 
a preferred source of financing (Harford, 1999). Similarly, dividends will decrease cash. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our variables. The results indicate that the mean 
(median) distance and road distance between a firm’s headquarter and the Paris region are 
142.24 (0) and 172.55 (13) km, respectively, and 75% of our sample firms are within 309 
kilometers of the Paris region. The average (median) controlling shareholder excess control rights 
ratio is 21.73% (18.30%), in line with previous French evidence (e.g., Boubaker, 2007). The cash 
to net assets ratio exhibits an average (median) value of 0.0981 (0.0562), indicating that liquid 
assets represent a sgnificant proportion of French firms' assets. We also check for correlation 
across these variables. We find that geographic variables, Distance, Road Distance, Outside 
Paris, and Distance_Dummy, are positively correlated with Cash, which, in turn is negatively 
related to Firm Size, Net Working Capital, Leverage, Capital Expenditure and Dividend, but 
positively related to Market-to-book, Cash Flow, R&D and Cash Flow Volatility.6 The positive 
                                                          
6 The variance inﬂation factor shows that multicollinearity is not a concern that would seriously affect our 
empirical results. The highest variance inﬂation factor value is 1.69, below the rule-of-thumb critical value of 10 
(Gujarati, 2003). The correlation results are in Appendix 3. 
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correlation between the distance from Paris and cash holding is substantiated by the results from 
the univariate analysis reported in Table 2, independently of the definition of distance used. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that remotely located firms provide a favorable 
environment for piling-up cash. These firms feature, indeed, considerable monitoring costs, a 
context that increases the controlling shareholder’s likelihood to entrench themselves and thus to 
misuse the built-up cash. 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
5. Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we first examine the effect of geography on corporate cash holding. We 
then assess the impact of excess control rights. 
5.1. Firms’ geographic location and cash holding 
Table 3, Panel A, reports the panel data results. The results indicate that, irrespective of 
the proxy variable used for distance (Distance, Road Distance, Outside_Paris, and 
Distance_Dummy, in, respectively, Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4), firms that are headquartered outside 
Paris appear to hold significantly more cash than their Paris counterparts. Our findings suggest 
that as firms move away their headquarters from the Paris region, they tend to accumulate 
significantly more cash in their balance sheet. Economically, firms that are located 309.4 km 
(75th percentile) far from Paris have, on average, a higher level of cash than firms that are 
headquartered in Paris, with a difference of €2.9m, holding all other explanatory variables 
constant at their mean values.7 We attribute this result to the view that distance is associated with 
a more costly monitoring, thereby increasing the likelihood that the controlling shareholder 
maintains large amounts of cash. Alternatively, firms headquartered in the Paris region hold less 
                                                          
7 Let CASH1 be cash holdings of firms from the 75th percentile. Using the average value of cash holdings of 
€161.9 m, the 75th percentile value of Distance of 309.4 km in Table 1 and the estimation coefficient of 
Distance of 0.0031 in Table 3, we obtain ln(CASH1 / €161.9m) = 0.0031∗ (ln(1+309.4) – ln (1+0)). This implies 
that CASH1 = €164.8m (=161.9m ∗ e[0.0031∗ (ln(1+309.4) – 0)]). Thus moving from the Paris region to 309.40 km away 
yields €2.9m (=164.8m –161.9m) higher cash holdings. 
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cash because their actions are more observable, resulting in low agency costs associated with 
liquid assets. 
Overall, our results provide strong support for hypothesis H1 that greater remoteness from 
metropolitan areas leads firms to hold more cash, and that firms’ geographic location alters the 
management of its cash holdings. More specifically, physical remoteness from metropolitan areas 
implies decreased outsiders’ ability to gain access to relevant information, and to monitor 
management, leading firms to accumulate unnecessary cash. Therefore, liquid assets that increase 
with distance may indicate that the controlling shareholder is engaging in opportunistic behavior 
with firm resources. 
Our results hold even after accounting for all potential control variables, which also 
indicate that large firms hold less cash, as Firm Size is negative and statistically significant in all 
our specifications. Similarly, Net working Capital, Leverage, Capital Expenditure, and Dividends 
are all negative and significant, as expected. In contrast, risky firms, as measured by their growth 
potentials, proxied by Market-to-book, financial distress, R&D, and Cash Flow Volatility, and 
profitable firms, measured by Cash Flow, appear to hold large cash positions, in line with 
previous evidence (e.g., Opler et al., 1999). 8 
In Table 3, Panel B, we test hypothesis H2 by examining the role that excess control rights 
play in the relation between geographic location and cash. For this purpose, we supplement our 
baseline model (Eq. (1)) with an interaction term between the geographic variables and the 
variable Excess Control, a dummy taking the value 1 if excess control rights of the controlling 
shareholder are above the median, and 0 otherwise. We identify the controlling shareholders as 
holders of the largest voting stake of the firm. As in La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002), we consider that a firm is controlled when at least one of its shareholders holds 10% 
                                                          
8 We use industry dummies in all regressions to account for the fact that Services and Consumer Durables are the 
most common sectors, representing 24.15% and 19.63% of all observations, respectively, compared to the 
Petroleum industry with only 0.78%, but whose firms are all headquartered in the Paris region, followed by the 
Services and Leisure sectors, and lastly by Food and Tobacco and Capital Goods industries (See, Appendix 2). 
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or more of the voting rights.9 The variable Excess Control Ratio is computed as the ratio      
(UCO–UCF)/UCO, where UCF (UCO) is cash-flow (control) rights of the controlling shareholder. 
To measure UCF and UCO, we trace the ownership chain back to the ultimate controlling 
shareholder and we compute his/her control and cash-flow rights following the approach used in 
Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). UCF is measured as the sum of the products 
of ownership stakes along each control chain. UCO is the sum of the weakest links of voting 
rights along each control chain. We then test the following model:  
Cash = β0 + β1 Geographic variables + β2 Geographic variables∗ Excess Control                         
+ β3 Excess Control + β4 Control variables + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies+ ε,  (4) 
We include Excess Control to account for the possibility that agency costs implied by 
excess control rights affect the way cash is managed. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. We 
are interested in the coefficient β2, which estimates the impact that excess control rights have on 
location’s effect on corporate cash holdings. Hypothesis H2 predicts that excess control rights 
exacerbate the location effect on cash holdings, as agency problems are expected to be 
particularly important at high levels of excess control rights. We hence expect β2 to be positive. 
We first examine location’s effect on cash using the continuous geographic variables 
Distance (Column 1) and Road Distance (Column 2). The results indicate that β2 is positive and 
statistically significant for both variables. This suggests that the level of cash increases when 
remoteness from the Paris region is coupled with greater excess control rights of the controlling 
shareholder. The economic implication of this finding is that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher 
levels of excess control rights that are located 309.40 km (75th percentile) away from the Paris 
region hold, on average, €5.38m more cash than their Paris counterparts.10 We obtain similar 
                                                          
9 The use of 20% leads to qualitatively unchanged results. 
10 As in footnote 7 above, let CASH1 be cash holdings of firm from the 75th percentile. Using the average value 
of cash holdings of €161.9m, the 75th percentile value of Distance of 309.4 km (Table 1), the estimation 
coefficient of Distance of 0.0023, and the estimation coefficient of the interaction term Distance∗  Excess 
Control of 0.0034 (Panel B, Table 3), we obtain ln(CASH1/€161.9) = 0.0023∗ln(1+309.4) + 0.0034∗ ln(1+309.4). 
This implies that CASH1 = €167.28m (=161.9m ∗ e[0.0023 ∗  ln(1+309.4) + 0.0034 ∗  ln(1+309.4)]). Thus, firms with high levels 
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results when we use geography dummies, Outside_Paris (Column 3) and Distance_Dummy 
(Column 4). The location effect on cash is therefore amplified in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder owning higher control rights than cash-flow rights. The control variables are not 
reported as they did not change. 
 In summary, our findings show that remotely located firms hoard more cash when excess 
control rights are high, in line with our predictions of hypothesis H2. Central to this is that 
separating cash-flow rights and control rights is closely associated with considerable monitoring 
costs by outsiders, thus providing the controlling shareholder with a greater ability to hoard cash 
for personal consumption (Jiang et al., 2011). Accordingly, accumulating cash in firms where 
remoteness from institutional investors and financial professionals is coupled with excess control 
rights may signal the relevance of agency problems in altering the management of cash. Our 
results hold even after accounting for the control variables, which we do not report as they are 
relatively similar to Panel A. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2. Impact of financial constraints on distance and cash holdings 
An alternative explanation is that remotely located firms experiencing excess control 
rights accumulate cash because of their increased difficulties in raising external finance. In this 
sense, Opler et al. (1999) contend that cash can be held for precautionary motives, so that firms 
can buffer against unexpected negative cash flow shocks without incurring additional costs from 
raising external finance. Central to this view is that separation of cash-flow rights and control 
rights is associated with high information asymmetry due to little transparency and low corporate 
disclosures (Fan and Wong, 2002; Attig et al., 2006; Ali et al., 2007). In addition, the high cost of 
getting information on remotely located firms may make external finance costly (Arena and 
Dewally, 2012). Based on these arguments, it is plausible that firms located away from the Paris 
area retain more cash because they face greater financial constraints.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of excess control rights located 309.40 km away from the Paris region have, on average, €5.38m (=167.28m – 
161.9m) higher cash than their counterparts in Paris.  
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To test this hypothesis, we first use payout as a proxy for financial constraints. We expect 
firms with high dividend payouts to have sufficient internal funds at their disposal to honor their 
contractual obligations and to meet their shareholders’ expectations, and are, therefore, less likely 
to be financially constrained. In contrast, financially constrained firms will tend to reduce their 
payouts to provide internal finance for their future investments (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988). Thus, 
firms with greater proportion of cash payout via dividends are presumed to be less financially 
constrained. The results reported in Table 4 show that the impact of excess control rights and 
distance on cash holdings is relatively similar across constrained and unconstrained firms.  
However, the relationship between governance and dividend is not clear, since firms with 
weak governance may pay low or high dividends depending on whether they adhere to the 
outcome or substitution models developed by La Porta et al. (2000). In Table 4, we use alternative 
measures of financial constraints, namely firm size, adjusted Kaplan and Zingales (1997), AKZ, 
index, and adjusted Whited and Wu (2006), AWW, index. Previous empirical studies highlight 
that, larger firms may face fewer financial constraints because they are ostensibly more mature 
and transparent for outsiders (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995). Alternatively, financial constraints may be a function of a combination of 
firms’ fundamental factors. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) develop an index based on five firm 
characteristics, namely, cash flow, investment opportunities, leverage, cash dividends and cash 
holdings.11 The higher this index, the higher the financial constraints, as when firms, particularly 
those with good investment opportunities, face difficulties in raising external finance, they 
exhaust their internal funds and their cash balances, provide small cash dividends, and reach their 
debt capacities. We adjust this model to reflect the financial constraint status for a broader set of 
French firms, following the empirical approach of Baker et al. (2003). Similarly, Whited and 
Wu (2006) index is based on six firm characteristics that reflect rare financial resources, namely, 
cash flow, dividends, long term debt, firm size, sales growth and industry sales growth. A higher 
                                                          
11 The KZ index decreases with firm cash flow, dividends, and cash holdings and increases with investment 
opportunities and leverage. 
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WW index implies that financial constraints are more severe. We also adapt this index to French 
firms, AWW, as in AKZ, above. The details on these proxy variables are in Appendix 1, Panel C. 
The results reported in the last six columns of Table 4 are qualitatively similar indicating 
that, in the presence of high levels of excess control rights, the level of cash held by remote firms 
is not determined by corporate financial constraints. Overall, our results suggest that remote firms 
hold abnormally large cash balances regardless of their ability to raise external finance, and 
provide further evidence that agency motives are behind large cash holdings. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform a series of sensitivity analysis tests to check the robustness of 
our results. Notably, we employ alternative measures of the dependent variable and the variables 
of interest. We also use alternative statistical approaches as well as alternative sample 
compositions and an alternative model specification. Results are reported in Table 5. 
6.1. Robustness to alternative measures of variables 
 Table 5 reports the results of robustness checks using alternative measurements of the 
main variables in Eq. (4). The control variables are not reported as they did not change. In Panel 
A, we first use industry-adjusted cash-to-net assets (Column 1), cash-to-sales (Column 2), and 
cash-to-assets (Column 3) as alternative proxy measures for cash holdings. Our findings 
consistently illustrate that the effect of distance on the cash held by firms with high excess control 
rights is positive and statistically significant, thus supporting hypothesis H2. The coefficient of β1 
is also positive and statistically significant, which supports hypothesis H1. Second, we test 
whether our results hinge on the geographic location metrics by using alternative dummy terms 
for distance, Distance100 (Column 4) and Distance300 (Column 5), which take the value 1 if the 
firm is, respectively, 100 and 300 km distant from the Paris region. Empirical analysis shows that 
the coefficient β2 of the interaction term continues to exhibit a significant positive coefficient, 
consistent with the notion that firms that are distant from the Paris region hold larger cash when 
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they experience greater separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. Third, firms that are 
more distant from their local primary airport are expected to be less accessible, and thus less 
observable to outsiders leading to potentially higher monitoring costs of managerial actions (John 
et al., 2011). Thus, we use a variable, Distance to a major airport, measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the closest airport with regular connections to 
Paris (Column 6). We consider that major airports in France are commercial service airports that 
service, regularly, at least one passenger boarding per day. The results support again the notion 
that remotely located firms having high excess control rights hold more cash. Lastly, we ensure 
that our results are robust to the measurement of excess control rights by using a continuous term, 
Excess Control Ratio, computed as the ratio (UCO–UCF)/UCO (Column 7), and a dummy term, 
Excess Control_High, taking the value 1 if the variable Excess Control Ratio is above the median 
of the sample of firms in which control exceeds ownership, and 0 otherwise (Column 8). The 
coefficient β2 is again positive and significant, indicating that cash holding is more affected by 
distance at high levels of excess control rights. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we test for the robustness of our estimation technique. First, we re-
estimate Eq. (4) using the random-effect estimation that takes into account the panel nature of the 
data and allows for time-invariant geographic variables (Column 1).  Our finding of a significant 
and positive association between excess control rights and location’s effect on cash remains 
unchanged. Second, we rerun Eq. (4) using the Fama–MacBeth procedure that estimates cross-
sectional regressions separately for each year (Column 2). The coefficient β2 continues to be 
positive and statistically significant. We furthermore employ the Fama-MacBeth estimation with 
Newey-West standard errors (Column 3). This approach accounts for serial correlation using a 
first-order autoregressive process (Haggard et al., 2008; Jin and Myers, 2006). Our findings 
remain consistent with the notion that distance positively affects the cash holdings of firms with a 
large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. Third, we use a dynamic panel estimation 
technique, the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We address any endogeneity 
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concerns by introducing lagged variables taken as instruments (Column 4). Although the 
magnitude of the interaction term estimate β2 is different from that found using other statistical 
methods, this change does not affect our conclusions. Finally, we estimate Eq. (4) using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) that cluster standard errors by both firm and  geographic location, 
i.e., inside or outside the Paris region (Column 5). The results indicate a positive and statistically 
significant effect of excess control rights on the cash held by remotely located firms. The control 
variables are not reported, as they did not change materially. 
 
6.2. Robustness to alternative sample compositions and model specification 
In Table 5, Panel C, we report results based on alternative sample compositions and model 
specification. In Column 1, we follow Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Malloy (2005) and 
restrict our analysis to firms located outside the Paris region where 62.88% in our sample firms 
are headquartered (see Appendix 2). In Column 2, we check that our results are not due to the 
exclusion of firms with no controlling shareholder (i.e., widely held firms) by including firms in 
which the largest shareholder owns less than 10% of control rights and assigning a value 0 to the 
variable Excess Control Ratio. In Column 3, we test the effect of geographic location on distance in 
the sample of widely held firms. The positive effect of distance on cash holdings may not hold for 
these firms if increased cash in remote firms is driven by the presence of controlling shareholders. 
Results of Column 3 consistently show that cash holdings of firms with no controlling shareholder are 
not affected by their geographic location.     
In Column 4, we rerun Eq. (4) after excluding observations for which the controlling 
shareholder owns more than half of the firm’s capital stock ownership. In this way we account for 
the possibility that the controlling shareholder’s impetus for obtaining private benefits may 
subside when this shareholder enjoy substantial financial interest derived from their equity 
ownership, as the personal wealth of large shareholders is closely tied to firm value, making them 
less likely to misuse the accumulated cash at their disposal (Claessens et al., 2002). In Column 5, 
we exclude group-affiliated firms to test for the possibility that cash is driven by internal capital 
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markets.  There is, indeed, evidence that group-affiliated firms have increased opportunities to be 
propped up by receiving cash assistance from internal capital markets (Bertrand et al., 2002; 
Cheung et al., 2006). In Columns 6 and 7, we check whether our results still hold for the sample 
of firms controlled by diversified shareholders, i.e., firms that are affiliated to a group or firms in 
which the controlling shareholder owns small cash-flow rights ranging between 10% and 20%. 
Indeed, an alternative explanation of higher cash holdings in remote firms with excess control 
rights is that the controlling shareholder tends to be more risk averse when having a major part of 
his/her fortune invested in the firm. In this case, cash is a convenient "buffer" for adverse events 
only when the controlling shareholder is undiversified. Contrary to this claim, results show that 
the positive effect of distance on cash remains highly significant when excess control is coupled 
with affiliation to a group or with low cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. This finding 
reinforces agency-based explanation for cash holdings. Finally, in Column 8, we run sensitivity 
analyses using a reduced cash model by excluding the variables Leverage, Capital Expenditure 
and Dividend from Eq. (4) (Opler et al. (1999)). Our results are qualitatively similar. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
7. Endogeneity tests 
Table 6 reports the results of the various specifications we use to deal with the potential 
endogeneity of the geographic location of firms’ headquarters. In Column 1, we consider that the 
choice of headquarter location can be dictated by the nature of certain industries, such as mining 
and agriculture (El Ghoul et al., 2012; John et al., 2011), making distance to metropolitan areas to 
be independent of agency problems arising from geographic remoteness. We, therefore, re-run  
Eq. (4) using only the primary sectors identified as agricultural (SIC codes 0100–0999) and 
mining (SIC codes 1000–1499, excluding SIC codes 1300–1399). In Column 2, we account for the 
possibility that firm size determines the geographic location of firms’ headquarters since large 
firms tend to be located in the core regions and that relocations are more frequent in small-sized 
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ﬁrms (e.g., John et al., 2011). The results obtained for the sample of large firms (i.e., total assets 
in excess of €100 million) are in line with those for the whole sample.  
Since important technology changes over time are likely to improve management 
visibility and reduce monitoring costs, thus mitigating the effect of distance on cash, we test 
whether our results are stronger in earlier sample period (pre-1998), by running Eq. (4) using only 
firms that are listed on the French market before 1998. Our results in Column 3 confirm that the 
location’s effect on cash is considerable, as β2 increases to 0.015, suggesting that agency costs 
due to excess control rights are higher when distance is accompanied by fewer possibilities to 
oversee management. In Column 4, we extend the sample period back to 1990 to capture the time 
effects that technological developments have on distance barriers by interacting Distance and 
Excess Control with the variable Pre-1998, a dummy that takes the value 1 if a firm existed before 
the beginning of our sample period, and 0 otherwise. Our results yield the same positive and 
significant location effect on cash. 
 Eq. (4) includes the variable Market-to-book, which may imply an endogeneity problem 
since the level of cash can, in turn, determine investment opportunities. To deal with this issue, we 
follow Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and employ an instrumental variable approach by using 
the three-year lagged sales growth, Three Year Sales Growth, as an instrument for the variable 
Market-to-book. Column 5 shows that the first-stage estimation consistently yields a strong 
positive effect of the instrument on the market-to-book ratio. Column 6 reports the second-stage 
results which indicate that investment opportunities have a significant positive effect on cash 
holdings and that the coefficient β2 remains strongly positive as previously found. 
 While remotely located firms with excess control rights imply large cash holdings, cash-
rich firms may, in turn, choose to locate their headquarters close to the Paris region as financial 
and business centers, so as to have more opportunities to invest their cash reserves in profitable 
projects. To address this endogeneity concern, we follow El Ghoul et al. (2012) and instrument 
distance by the two-digit industry average of distance, Ind Adjusted Distance, which presumably 
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affects firms’ location without depending on the level of cash in Column 7. Estimating Eq. (1) 
illustrates that the variable Ind Adjusted Distance has a strongly positive association with the 
variable Distance, indicating that the choice of the instrument is judicious. Our results of the two-
stage least-squares estimation of Eq. (4), reported in Column 8, are in line with the previous 
findings, documenting that the geographic location of firms with substantial excess control rights 
has a highly significant positive effect on cash holdings. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
8. Conclusion 
We test the hypothesis that monitoring the management is potentially less effective for 
firms that are located in remote areas because of the lower observability of managerial actions. 
We focus on the effects of distance on corporate cash holdings as a primary corporate policy. 
Using a sample of 4,111 observations of publicly listed French firms over a period extending from 
1998 to 2007, we find that the controlling shareholder can accumulate cash as a way to increase 
opportunities to obtain private benefits by converting more cash into private benefits when their 
firms are headquartered outside the Paris region leading to severe agency problems. We also find 
that the positive effect of distance on cash is amplified when combined with a large separation of 
cash-flow rights and control rights. Our results provide evidence that remotely located firms keep 
markedly larger cash holdings when the controlling shareholder is more entrenched. Our results 
hold even after accounting for a number of control variables, for cash constraints and a battery of 
robustness checks to test for alternative proxy variables and statistical specifications.  
Our results provide evidence that geographic remoteness plays a key role in altering 
corporate cash policies. Remote firms are more inclined to accumulate cash because of the lower 
observability of their managerial actions that makes their monitoring costly, especially in the 
presence of a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights of the controlling shareholder. 
While our evidence is limited to the French case, further research will highlight the extent to 
which cash management in remotely located firms constitutes a channel for extracting private 
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benefits by the controlling shareholder when its interests that are at odds with those of other 
shareholders is not country dependent.  
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Appendix 1- Variables’ description 
Variable Definition 
Panel A. Main variables 
Cash Cash holdings computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities. 
Distance Natural logarithm of one plus distance in kilometers to the Paris region. 
Road Distance Natural logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the Paris 
region. 
Outside_Paris Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm is located outside the Paris region, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Distance_Dummy Dummy variable equals 1 if Distance is above its median value for the 
sample of firms that are outside the Paris region, and 0 otherwise. 
Excess Control Ratio Excess control rights of the controlling shareholder, computed as the 
ratio (UCO–UCF)/UCO, where UCF (UCO) is cash-flow (control) 
rights of the controlling shareholder. 
Excess Control Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the variable Excess Control 
Ratio is above sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total sales (in thousands of euros). 
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio, measured as the book value of assets, less the 
book value of equity, plus the market value of equity, divided by assets.  
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to net assets.  
Cash  Flow Operating income less interest and taxes, divided by net assets. 
Net Working Capital Current assets less current liabilities and cash, divided by net assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility  Standard deviation of cash flow-to-net assets for the past five years.  
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Capital Expenditure  Ratio of capital expenditure to net assets. 
Dividend Ratio of cash dividend to total assets.  
Panel B. Robustness check variables 
Industry adjusted cash-
to-net assets ratio 
 
Industry adjusted ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets 
based on Campbell's (1996) classification, where net assets are total 
assets minus cash and marketable securities. 
Cash-to sales Ratio of cash and marketable securities to sales. 
Cash-to-assets Ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. 
Distance100 Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm is headquartered outside of a 100 
km to the Paris region, and 0 otherwise.  
Distance300 Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm is headquartered outside of a 300 
km to the Paris region, and 0 otherwise. 
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Distance to a major 
airport 
Natural logarithm of one plus road distance in kilometers to the closest 
airport with regular connections to Paris. 
Ind Adjusted Distance An instrument for the variable Distance. It is the two-digit industry 
average of Distance, in the year the firm enters the Worldscope dataset. 
Excess Control_High Dummy variable equals 1 if the variable Excess Control Ratio is above 
sample median for firms where control exceeds ownership, and 0 
otherwise. 
Pre-1998 Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm existed before the start of our sample 
period, and 0 otherwise. 
Three Year Sales 
Growth 
Three year lagged sales growth. 
Panel C. Financial constraints variables 
Dividend Payout Ratio Ratio of dividends to earnings. 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of euros). 
AKZ index The adjusted Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index obtained by adjusting 
the coefficients estimates to reflect the financial constraint status for a 
broader set of French firms, following the empirical approach of Baker 
et al. (2003), by reassign the weights of the original KZ index so that 
any of the five variables explains one-fifth of the variability of the index 
while keeping unchanged the signs of the weights of the variables, as 
follows: 
 AKZ (“adjusted” KZ index) =   − 1.115 ∗  KZ-Cash Flow + 0.147∗ Q+ 
2.333∗  KZ-Leverage –  9.676∗ KZ-Dividends – 7.381∗ KZ-Cash, where 
KZ-Cash Flow is operating income plus depreciation divided by 
beginning-of-period PPE (Property, Plant and Equipment). Q is market 
value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity all 
divided by book value of assets. KZ-Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
over total capital, where total capital is total debt plus total stockholders’ 
equity. KZ-Dividends are cash dividends divided by beginning-of-period 
PPE. KZ-Cash are cash and marketable securities divided by beginning-
of-period PPE. 
AWW index The adjusted Whited and Wu (2006) index. Since the original WW 
index is developed from COMPUSTAT quarterly data for U.S. firms, 
we adjust it using the same approach adopted for the AKZ index, and 
obtain the following model: 
AWW index (“adjusted” WW index) = – 0.067 ∗  WW-Cash Flow – 
0.073 ∗  Divdummy + 0.140 ∗  WW-Leverage – 0.016 ∗  WW-Size – 
0.191 ∗  Sales Growth +0.007∗ Industry Sales Growth, where WW-Cash 
Flow is operating income plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-
period total assets. Dividummy is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. WW-Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debt over total assets. WW-Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the French 
consumer price index series. Sales Growth is annual percentage change 
in sales in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the French consumer 
price index (CPI) series. Industry Sales Growth is two-digit SIC 
industry average of Sales Growth, where industry is defined according 
to Campbell’s (1996) industry classification. 
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Appendix 2- Sample characteristics 
This table provides the distribution of firms by industry using Campbell’s (1996) classification and by geographic location to the Paris 
region based on the dummy variable Outside_Paris that takes the value 1 if the firm is located outside the Paris region, and 0 otherwise. 
N is the number of firm –year observations. 
 
 
Industry 
Two-digit SIC codes Outside_Paris N % 
Total 1 0 
N % 
Total 
% 
Within 
category 
N % 
Total 
%  
Within 
category 
Petroleum 13, 29 0 0.000 0.000 32 0.780 100.00 32 0.780 
Consumer durables 25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57 364 8.850 45.105 443 10.78 54.895 807 19.63 
Basic industry 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33 130 3.160 30.660 294 7.150 69.340 424 10.31 
Food and tobacco 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54 165 4.010 58.511 117 2.850 41.489 282 6.860 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 89 2.160 44.949 109 2.650 55.051 198 4.820 
Capital goods 34, 35, 38 249 6.060 57.506 184 4.480 42.494 433 10.53 
Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 34 0.830 30.631 77 1.870 69.369 111 2.700 
Utilities 46, 48 26 0.630 20.968 98 2.380 79.032 124 3.020 
Textiles and trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 201 4.890 43.982 256 6.230 56.018 457 11.12 
Services 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89 230 5.590 23.162 763 18.56 76.838 993 24.15 
Leisure 27, 58, 70, 78, 79 38 0.920 15.200 212 5.160 84.800 250 6.080 
Total  1,526 37.12 37.120 2,585 62.88 62.880 4,111 100.0 
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Appendix 3 – Correlations 
This table reports the results of pairwise correlations among the variables used. All variables in the table are defined in Appendix 1. a,b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5   6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.Cash 1               
2.Distance 0.0439a 1              
3.Road Distance 0.0448a 0.9949a 1             
4.Outside_Paris 0.0507a 0.8299a 0.8133a 1            
5.Distance_Dummy 0.0501a 0.7714a 0.7650a 0.6078a 1           
6.Excess Control 0.0552a –0.0363b –0.0406a –0.0040 –0.0485a 1          
7.Firm Size –0.0788a –0.2367a –0.2336a –0.1532a –0.194a –0.0635a 1         
8.Market-to-book 0.7201a –0.0101 –0.0090 –0.0023 –0.0505 a 0.0506a –0.0962a 1        
9.R&D 0.4447a 0.0135 0.0123 0.0327b 0.0073 0.0296c –0.0237 0.3356a 1       
10.Cash Flow 0.0908a 0.0606a 0.0605a 0.0268c 0.0177 –0.0324b 0.2705a 0.0649a 0.0013 1      
11.Net Working 
Capital –0.1161
a 0.1851a 0.1882a –0.0944a 0.1587 a –0.0297c –0.2047a –0.1094a 0.0636a 0.1459a 1     
12.Cash Flow 
Volatility 0.2939
a –0.0770a –0.0771a –0.0384b –0.0996 a 0.0196 –0.0878a 0.2420a 0.1479a 0.0022 –0.0680a 1    
13.Leverage –0.2231a –0.0110 –0.0088 –0.0322b 0.0373b –0.0002 0.1743a –0.1457a –0.1021a –0.0778a –0.3041a –0.0281c 1   
14.Capital Expenditure –0.0730a 0.0009 0.0045 –0.0189 0.0096 0.0113 –0.0856a 0.1027a 0.0195 0.1224a –0.1006a –0.0052 0.1743a 1  
15.Dividend –0.0944a 0.0816a 0.0822a 0.0296c 0.0283c 0.0175 0.0508a 0.1835a –0.0014 0.2894a 0.1854a –0.0057 –0.1925a 0.0257c 1 
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Table 1- Descriptive statistics    
This table provides descriptive statistics of variables. Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities. Distance is distance in kilometers to the Paris region. Road Distance is road distance in kilometers to the Paris region.   
Distance to a major airport is road distance in kilometers to the closest airport with regular connections to Paris. Excess Control Ratio is excess control rights 
of the controlling shareholder, computed as the ratio (UCO–UCF) / UCO, where UCF (UCO) is cash-flow (control) rights of the controlling shareholder. All 
other variables in the table are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
1st  
percentile 
99th 
percentile 
Cash ratio       0.0981   0.0562     0.0961   0.0306       0.1043   0.0004        0.2075 
Cash (in millions of euros) 161.898   8.546 641.024   2.510   45.262   0.021 3,158.000 
Distance (in kilometers) 142.24   0.0000 201.60   0.0000 309.40   0.0000    674.40 
Road Distance (in kilometers) 172.55 13.000 245.34   0.0000 384.00   0.0000    904.00 
Distance to a major airport (in kilometers)   39.5034   0.0000   56.0903   0.0000   76.000   0.0000    191.00 
Excess Control Ratio     0.2173   0.1830     0.2216   0.0269     0.3374   0.0000        0.9980 
Firm Size   12.206 11.916     2.1971 10.745   13.499   3.4533      15.044 
Market-to-book     1.4802   1.1605     1.1255   1.0605     1.5665   0.6553        2.2405 
R&D      0.0101   0.0000     0.0384   0.0000     0.0023   0.0000        0.0224 
Cash Flow     0.0428   0.0498     0.0999   0.0415     0.0922 –0.5727        0.1284 
Net Working Capital     0.1038   0.0596     0.2193   0.0000     0.2260 –0.8557        0.3828 
Cash Flow Volatility     0.0301   0.0228     0.0236   0.0144     0.0420   0.0025        0.0691 
Leverage     0.2270   0.2158     0.1642   0.1000     0.3330   0.0000        0.4473 
Capital Expenditure     0.0439   0.0313     0.0503   0.0091     0.0613   0.0000        0.0998 
Dividend     0.0099   0.0049     0.0155   0.0000     0.0133   0.0000        0.0233 
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Table 2-   Univariate tests for differences in cash holdings  
 
This table reports the results of pairwise comparison of means (medians) of cash ratio in the 
groups of firms inside and outside the Paris region using t-tests of means (Mann–Whitney rank 
sum tests). All variables in the table are defined in Appendix 1. The p-value of the t-test and 
medians tests of equality is reported in parentheses.  a ,b and c denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Means p-value for difference 
Medians p-value for 
difference 
Outside Paris =0 0.0842 
(0.000)a 
0.0521 
(0.000)a Outside Paris =1 0.1054 0.0595 
Distance_Dummy =0   0.0893 
(0.000)a 
0.0534 
(0.000)a Distance_Dummy =1 0.1107 0.0628 
Road Distance_Dummy =0 0.0880 
(0.000)a 
0.0560 
(0.002)a Road Distance_Dummy =1 0.1168 0.0630 
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Table 3 - Effects of firms’ geographic location on cash holdings  
This table reports the results of the pooled OLS estimation of the effects of firms’ geographic location on cash 
holdings (Panel A) and the effects of excess control rights on the relation between cash and geographic location 
(Panel B). The dependent variable, Cash, is the natural logarithm of cash and marketable securities to net assets, 
which is total assets minus cash and marketable securities. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Year 
dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in all regressions. The 
sample includes 4,111 observations. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 
2009). a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Panel A.  Individual effects 
Distance 0.0031 
(3.49)a 
    
Road Distance  0.0032 
(3.54)a 
   
Outside_Paris   0.0126 
(2.94)a 
  
Distance_Dummy      0.0151 
(3.08)a 
 
Firm Size –0.0028 
(–2.76)a 
–0.0028 
(–2.76)a 
–0.0034 
(–3.24)a 
–0.0029 
(–2.86)a 
 
Market-to-book 0.0775  
(13.09)a 
0.0774  
(13.10)a 
0.0776  
(12.95)a 
0.0774  
(13.09)a 
 
R&D  0.8353   
(4.23)a 
0.8354   
(4.22)a 
0.8346   
(4.23)a 
0.8414  
(4.22)a   
 
Cash Flow 0.0467  
 (8.57)a 
0.0467  
 (8.58)a 
0.0471  
 (8.42)a 
0.0469  
(8.62)a 
 
Net Working Capital –0.0926 
(–5.29)a 
–0.0928 
(–5.30)a 
–0.0904 
(–5.16)a 
–0.0937 
(–5.33)a 
 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.6778   
(6.65)a 
0.6785   
(6.67)a 
0.6683   
(6.50)a 
0.6806 
(6.70)a    
 
Leverage –0.1404 
(–9.38)a 
–0.1405 
(–9.39)a 
–0.1375 
(–9.35)a 
–0.1404 
(–9.41)a 
 
Capital Expenditure –0.0036 
(–2.99)a 
–0.0036 
(–3.00)a 
–0.0034 
(–2.95)a 
–0.0037 
(–3.13)a 
 
Dividend –0.5377 
(–3.35)a 
–0.5382 
(–3.34)a 
–0.5122 
(–3.16)a 
–0.5341 
(–3.29)a 
 
Intercept 0.0324  
(1.09) 
0.0316  
(1.04) 
0.0503  
(1.72)c 
0.0373 
(1.24) 
 
Year  dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Adjusted R-squared 64.61 % 64.61 % 64.49 % 64.55%  
Panel B.  Interaction effects 
Distance 0.0023 
(2.66)a 
    
Distance∗  Excess Control 0.0034 
(3.11)a 
    
Road Distance  0.0021 
(2.59)a 
   
Road Distance∗  Excess Control  0.0036 
(2.95)a 
   
Outside_Paris   0.0118 
(2.73)a 
  
Outside_Paris∗  Excess Control   0.0118 
(2.64)a 
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Distance_Dummy    0.0264 
(5.40)a 
 
 
Distance_Dummy∗ Excess Control    0.0174 
(2.70)a 
 
Excess Control 0.0569 
(3.15)a 
0.0631 
(3.32)a 
0.0297 
(1.68)c 
0.0560 
(3.04)a 
 
Adjusted R-squared 64.84% 66.44% 68.00% 65.57%  
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Table 4- Financial constraints, excess control rights and the effects of firms’ geographic location on cash holdings 
This table reports the results of the pooled OLS estimation of the effects of excess control rights on the relation between firms’ geographic location and cash holdings in the groups of financially constrained (Constrained) and 
unconstrained (Unconstrained) firms sorted according to Dividend Payout Ratio, Firm Size, AKZ index and AWW index (see the details on these proxy variables in Appendix 1, Panel C ). Dependent variable, Cash, is cash 
holdings computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Year 
dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in all regressions. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009). a,b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable Dividend Payout Ratio Firm Size AKZ index AWW index 
 Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Distance 0.0017 
(1.66)c 
0.0034 
(2.23)b 
0.0032 
(2.37)b 
0.0021 
(1.99)b 
0.0041 
(2.53)b 
0.0023 
(2.69)a 
0.0036 
(3.05)a 
0.0022 
(1.98)b 
Distance∗ Excess Control 0.0034 
(2.88)b 
0.0041 
(2.29)b 
0.0040 
(2.46)b 
0.0037 
(2.96)a 
0.0036 
(2.07)b 
0.0026 
(2.60)b 
0.0039 
(2.41)b 
0.0032 
(2.72)a 
Excess Control 0.0459 
(2.19)b 
0.1076 
(3.70)a 
0.1010 
(3.11)a 
0.0568 
(2.72)a 
0.1128 
(3.07)a 
0.0344 
(2.04)b 
0.0568 
(2.47)b 
0.0710 
(3.03)a 
Firm Size –0.0041 
(–2.75)a 
–0.0039 
(–1.99)b 
0.0009 
(0.32) 
–0024 
(–1.75)c 
–0.0075 
(–3.62)a 
0.0003 
(0.40) 
–0.0023 
(–1.81)c 
–0.0029 
(–2.28)b 
Market-to-book 0.0747 
(8.34)a 
0.0790 
(11.98)a 
0.0848 
(11.24)a 
0.0597 
(7.83)a 
0.0790 
(8.19)a 
0.0676 
(10.46)a 
0.0740   
(11.26)a 
0.0780 
(6.78)a 
R&D  0.8885 
(2.78)a 
0.8070 
(3.16)a 
0.9391 
(3.39)a 
0.6522 
(3.77)a 
0.9043 
(3.87)a 
0.5786 
(2.79)a 
1.0409 
(4.07)a 
0.6482 
(2.86)a 
Cash Flow 0.0459 
(5.46)a 
0.0278 
(1.87)c 
0.0457 
(7.29)a 
0.0360 
(6.91)a 
0.0543 
(8.38)a 
0.0312 
(6.13)a 
0.0430 
(6.33)a 
0.0460 
(6.51)a 
Net Working Capital –0.0887 
(–3.49)a 
–0.1072 
(–4.46)a 
–0.0834 
(–3.73)a 
-0.1143 
(–3.99)a 
–0.1549 
(–5.21)a 
–0.0670 
(–3.39)a 
–0.0916 
(–3.81)a 
–0.0957 
(–4.04)a 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.6126 
 (4.56)a 
0.6470 
(4.83)a 
0.6186 
(3.99)a 
0.5845 
(4.72)a 
0.8438 
(5.72)a 
0.2408 
(1.96)c 
0.7186 
(4.64)a 
0.6695 
(5.03)a 
Leverage –0.1318 
(–5.78)a 
–0.1544 
(–7.59)a 
–0.1714 
(–6.89)a 
–0.1313 
(–6.33)a 
–0.2316 
(–2.73)a 
–0.0633 
(–4.24)a 
–0.1247 
(–5.94)a 
–0.1710 
(–7.62)a 
Capital Expenditure –0.0046 
(–0.69) 
–0.0044 
(–4.36)a 
–0.0114 
(–1.65)c 
–0.0037 
(–3.47)a 
–0.0044 
(–4.98)a 
–0.0129 
(–1.60) 
–0.0076 
(–1.11) 
–0.0042 
(–4.05)a 
Dividend –0.6946 
(–3.43)a 
0.3243 
(0.19) 
–0.5141 
(–2.72)a 
–0.4995 
(–1.86)c 
–0.7347 
(–3.31)a 
–0.4669 
(–2.82)a 
–0.6333 
(–3.10)a 
–0.2805 
(–1.27) 
Intercept –0.0707  
(–2.17) b  
0.0240 
(0.48)  
–0.0733 
(–2.45)b  
0.0971 
(2.54)b  
0.1246 
(2.98)a 
0.0241 
(0.36)  
0.0265 
(0.83)  
0.0723 
(1.54)  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value for difference 0.69 0.83 0.31 0.65 
Number of observations  2,055 2,056 2,055 2,056 2,055 2,056 2,055 2,056 
Adjusted R-squared 64.24% 66.34% 69.95% 58.57% 66.18% 60.19% 74.49% 50.65% 
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Table 5- Robustness checks 
This table reports the results of robustness checks. In Panel A, we use alternative measures of the dependent variables (Columns 1-3) and alternative measures of independent 
variables (Columns 4-8). Dependent variable is cash holdings. In Column 1, it is computed as the natural logarithm of industry adjusted ratio of cash and marketable securities 
to net assets based on Campbell's (1996) classification, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities. In Columns 2 and 3, it is computed as the 
natural logarithm of cash-to-sales ratio and the natural logarithm of cash-to-assets ratio, respectively. In Columns 4-8, it is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to net assets. In Panel B, we test for robustness of our results to alternative statistical methods. We use alternative statistical approaches: random-effect 
estimation (Column 1); Fama-MacBeth Estimation (Column 2); Fama-MacBeth Estimation with Newey-West standard errors (Column 3); system GMM (Column 4); and 
double clustering at the firm and location levels (Column 5). In Panel C, we use alternative sample compositions: excluding Paris region firms (Column 1); including widely 
held firms (Column 2); considering only widely held firms (Column 3); excluding firms with UCF higher than 50% (Column 4); excluding group-affiliated firms (Column 5); 
considering only group-affiliated firms (Column 6); and using the sample of firms with UCF ranging between 10% and 20% (Column 7). We also use reduced cash model as 
alternative model specification excluding Leverage, Capital Expenditure and Dividend (Column 8). All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Year dummies and industry 
dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in many specifications. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.  The 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009) in regressions of Panel A and Panel C. a, b and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Robustness to alternative variables’ measures 
 Alternative dependent variables Alternative independent variables 
Variable 
Industry 
adjusted 
cash-to-net 
assets ratio 
(1) 
Cash-to-
sales 
ratio 
 
(2) 
Cash-to-
assets 
ratio 
 
(3) 
Distance 
measure 
= 
Distance100 
(4) 
Distance 
measure 
= 
Distance300 
(5) 
Distance 
measure 
= Distance to a 
major airport 
(6) 
Excess Control measure 
=Excess Control Ratio 
 
 
(7) 
Excess Control measure 
= 
Excess Control_High 
 
(8) 
Distance 0.0019 
(2.00)b 
0.0359 
(2.71)a 
0.0269 
(1.97)b 
   0.0012 
(3.42)a 
0.0041 
(3.18)a 
Distance∗  Excess 
Control 
0.0030 
(2.68)a 
0.0137 
(8.62)a 
0.0506 
(4.13)a 
      
Excess Control 0.0647 
(3.26)a 
0.1239 
(0.44) 
0.3772 
(1.65)c 
0.0535 
(2.99)a 
0.0557 
(3.14)a 
0.0641 
(3.55)a 
   
Distance measure    0.0113 
(2.35)b 
0.0106 
(2.15)b 
0.0029 
(2.37)b 
   
Distance measure 
∗ Excess Control 
   0.0197 
(2.87)a 
0.0206 
(2.61)a 
0.0036 
(3.50)a 
   
Distance ∗   Excess 
Control measure 
      0.0014 
(2.62)a 
0.0031 
(1.97)b 
Excess Control 
measure 
      0.0059 
(1.46) 
0.0026 
(0.45) 
Year dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Adjusted R-
squared 
52.35% 48.21% 32.77% 64.76 % 64.87 % 66.83% 49.61% 64.69% 
          
Panel B.  Robustness to alternative statistical methods 
 Random- 
effect 
estimation  
(1) 
Fama-MacBeth  
Estimation  
 
(2) 
Fama-MacBeth   
Estimation with Newey-West  
 
(3) 
System 
GMM  
 
(4) 
Double clustering 
 
 
(5) 
Distance 0.0049 
(4.14)a 
0.0027 
(3.88)a 
0.0027 
(2.99)b 
0.0473 
(2.37)b 
0.0023 
(4.25)a 
Distance∗  
Excess Control 
0.0021 
(2.87)a 
0.0028 
(4.00)a 
0.0028 
(3.28)a 
0.0114 
(2.61)a 
0.0034 
(7.31)a 
Excess Control 0.0182   
(0.98) 
0.0589   
(3.90)a 
0.0589   
(2.98)b 
1.6520  
(2.50)b 
0.0569 
(3.63)a 
Year dummies 
 
No No No Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes No No Yes Yes 
      
Number of 
observations  
4,111 Groups=10 Groups=10 AR(1)=0.001 
AR(2)=0.546 
4,111 
Adjusted R-
squared 
66.12% 64.17% Avg R-squared  64.17% Sargan=0.588 
Hansen=0.974 
64.84% 
Panel C.  Robustness  to alternative sample compositions and model specification 
 Alternative sample compositions Alternative model 
specification 
 
Excluding 
Paris region 
firms 
 
(1) 
Including 
widely  
held firms 
 
(2)  
Sample 
of widely  
held 
firms 
(3) 
Excluding 
firms with  
UCF>=50% 
 
(4) 
Excluding  
group-affiliated  
firms 
 
(5) 
Group-
affiliated 
firms 
 
(6) 
Firms with 
10%<UCF<20% 
 
 
(7) 
 
Reduced  
cash model 
 
(8) 
Distance 0.0018 
(1.99)b 
0.0048 
(2.61)a 
0.0061 
(1.21) 
0.0036 
(2.99)a 
0.0020 
(2.25)b 
0.0019 
(2.26)b 
0.0048 
(1.75)c 
0.0027 
(2.61)a 
Distance∗  
Excess Control 
0.0034 
(3.03)a 
0.0045 
(3.72)a 
 0.0040 
(2.65)a 
0.0035 
(3.15)a 
0.0037 
(3.66)a 
0.0212 
(1.99)b 
0.0036 
(2.80)a 
Excess Control 0.0547    
(2.94)a 
0.0940   
(3.57)a   
  0.0502 
(2.53)b     
0.0552   
(3.02)a 
0.0571 
(3.01)a     
0.3824 
(2.53)b     
0.0593    
(2.97)a 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
3,769 4,317 206 2,480 1,438 2,673 529 4,111 
Adjusted R-
squared 
64.85% 65.95% 75.61% 69.32% 65.03% 66.89% 51.68% 61.31% 
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Table 6- Endogeneity tests 
This table reports the results of some endogeneity tests. We use the sample of firms in the primary sectors (i.e., mining and agriculture sectors) (Column 1); the sample of firms with 
assets above € 100 million (Column 2); the sample of firms that first listed on the French stock market prior to 1998 (Column 3); the 1990-2007 sample (Column 4). We use instrumental 
variables approach in Columns 5-8. The Dependent variable in Columns 1-4, 6 and 8 is Cash. Pre-1998 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm existed before the start of our 
sample period, and 0 otherwise. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included but not reported. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. In Column 6, Eq. (4) is estimated with Three Year Sales Growth, the three-year sales growth, as an instrument for Market-to-book. The results of the corresponding first 
stage regression (Market-to-book as dependent variable) are reported in Column 5. In Column 8, Eq. (4) is estimated with Ind Adjusted Distance as an instrument for Distance, where Ind 
Adjusted Distance is the two-digit SIC industry average of Distance in the year the firm enters the Worldscope dataset. The results of the corresponding first stage regression (Distance as 
dependent variable) are reported in Column 7. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 
1980) and clustered at the firm level (Peterson, 2009). a,b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Primary 
sectors 
(1) 
Large 
firms 
(2) 
Pre-1998  
(3) 
1990-2007 
 
(4) 
 First stage 
 
(5) 
2SLS 
 
(6) 
 First stage 
 
(7) 
2SLS 
 
(8) 
Distance 0.0019 
(2.03)b 
0.0018 
(2.04)b 
0.0024 
(2.65)a 
   0.0023 
(1.72)c 
Ind Adjusted 
Distance 
0.4487 
(12.63)a 
0.0156 
(2.61)a 
Distance∗  
Excess Control 
0.0027 
(2.20)b 
0.0039 
(3.59)a 
0.0157 
(3.13)a 
   0.0054 
(2.63)a 
  0.0040 
(2.61)a 
Distance∗  
Pre-1998 
   0.0015 
(2.13)b 
      
Distance∗  
Excess Control∗ pre-
1998 
   0.0116 
(2.96)a 
      
Excess Control 0.0495    
(2.53)b 
0.0324    
(1.85)c 
0.0165    
(0.16) 
0.0132    
(0.21) 
  0.0887    
(3.95)a 
  0.0598    
(3.34)a 
Firm Size –0.0018 
(–1.62) 
–0.0033 
(–2.54)b 
–0.0644 
(–5.05)a 
–0.0739 
(–8.68)a 
Firm Size –0.0435 
(–2.82)a 
–0.0059 
(–3.42)a 
Firm Size –0.3171 
(–15.30)a 
0.0007 
(0.38) 
Market-to-book 0.0696 
(9.86)a 
0.0693 
(8.47)a 
0.0449 
(2.76)a 
0.0458 
(4.45)a 
Three Year 
Sales Growth 
0.0027 
(2.97)a 
0.0185 
(2.17)b 
Market-to-
book 
0.0460 
(2.39)b 
0.0764 
(12.82)a 
R&D  0.8441 
(2.92)a 
1.1333 
(4.65)a 
0.9980 
(2.79)a 
0.0347 
(1.69)c 
R&D  9.5354 
(4.19)a 
1.3785 
(2.17)b 
R&D  0.9684 
(0.86) 
0.8163 
(4.12)a 
Cash Flow 0.0439 
(9.00)a 
0.0389 
(4.90)a 
0.4865 
(2.22)b 
0.2261 
(7.83)a 
Cash Flow 0.3516 
(2.08)b 
0.0193 
(2.00)b 
Cash Flow 0.4615 
(3.21)a 
0.0437 
(7.61)a 
Net Working Capital –0.0722 
(–3.58)a 
–0.0883 
(–4.41)a 
–0.0164 
(–2.99)a 
–0.0169 
(–5.31)a 
Net Working 
Capital 
–0.8880 
(–4.65)a 
–0.1477 
(–5.58)a 
Net Working 
Capital 
1.3110 
(6.45)a 
–0.1150 
(–5.46)a 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.9305 
(5.50)a 
0.5898 
(5.84)a 
1.3183 
(1.80)c 
0.3318 
(6.44)a 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
6.5895 
(2.92)a 
1.0191    
(3.67)a 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
–9.5402 
(–4.74)a 
0.8172 
 (7.41)a 
Leverage –0.1348 
(–6.71)a 
–0.1242 
(–7.53)a 
–0.2905 
(–2.91)a 
–0.3333 
(–3.91)a 
Leverage –0.6857 
(3.52)a 
–0.1890 
(–8.00)a 
Leverage 1.0249 
(3.80)a 
–0.1595 
(–9.43)a 
Capital Expenditure –0.0029 
(–5.44)a 
–0.0109 
(–1.33) 
0.0234   
(0.20) 
–0.0029 
(–0.71) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
0.0078 
(0.21) 
0.0052    
(1.93)a 
Capital 
Expenditure 
2.5930 
(3.16)a 
–0.0033 
(–3.27)a 
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Dividend –0.2828 
(–1.39) 
–0.3964 
(–1.79)c 
–0.0775    
(–1.48) 
–0.0788    
(–2.36)b 
Dividend 16.434 
(5.82)a 
0.3295 
(0.93) 
Dividend 12.7448 
(4.50)a 
–0.7466 
(–3.90)a 
Intercept 0.0052 
(0.21) 
0.0604 
(1.83)c 
–2.7910 
(–6.07)a 
–2.3653 
(–11.65)a 
Intercept 0.1525  
(3.91)a 
1.6677 
(7.32)a 
Intercept 4.0678 
(10.98)a 
0.0313  
(0.73) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  No Yes 
Number of 
observations 
113 3,433 2,785 6,812 Number of 
observations 
4,111 4,111 Number of 
observations 
4,111 4,111 
Adjusted R-squared 64.37% 64.37% 60.09% 69.99 % Adjusted R-
squared 
37.06% 30.93% Adjusted R-
squared 
14.67% 64.71% 
